Document No.1A - The
Questions Answered(?)
The answers to your questions
are as follows:
Q: Does Glaxo accept responsibility
for those people who have been disabled by Myodil induced
chronic Arachnoiditis?
A: Whilst the company has every sympathy for patients who
think they have suffered injury as a result of the administration
of Myodil, Glaxo believes it acted responsibly at all times
in relation to the supply of Myodil. Glaxo supplied this
diagnostic product to meet the needs of a very knowledgeable
and specialist medical profession for many years, until
it was superseded by newer products and technology. (Note
1)
Q: Do you have any idea
how many people in Britain had Myodil myelograms between
1945 and 1987?
A: Using sales of Myodil as an indication we estimate that
over 300,000 patients received a myelogram using Myodil.
Q: Do you have any idea
how many people suffered long-term spinal damage as a result?
A: No, we do not. The symptoms and issues surrounding arachnoiditis
are complex. Current medical opinion indicates that the
symptoms of which patients are complaining are most likely
due to the original condition, degenerative back disease,
or surgery and other medical procedures. It should not be
overlooked that people undergoing myelograms were by definition
already back-sufferers. (Note
2)
Q: Given that Glaxo acknowledged
in its product data sheets from August 1971 onwards that
arachnoiditis could result from Myodil myelograms, would
Glaxo like to offer an apology to those people who have
suffered long term spinal damage as a result of Myodil myelograms?
A: We have every sympathy with people who think they have
been injured, but the company believes that it acted responsibly
at all times. All pharmaceutical products have side-effects
which doctors have to take into account by weighing up against
the benefit to be gained by using the products. The company
warned of the possibility of arachnoiditis as soon as it
became aware of the issue. (Note
3)
Q: Is Glaxo prepared to
consider a compensation scheme for those sufferers who were
not among the 425 who benefited from the 1995 settlement.
A: The settlement was achieved following over four years
of complex litigation involving the in-depth analysis of
individuals' medical records. Over this period (and before)
the issues surrounding Myodil and arachnoiditis were subject
to extensive publicity which gave potential claimants the
ample opportunity to put forward their cases in the lead-up
to the settlement. We therefore consider the matter closed.
(We are of course in the process of working towards similar
settlements in Scotland and Northern Ireland.)
(Note 4)
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Q: What safety and toxicity
tests did Glaxo carry out in the development of Myodil?
A: When Myodil was first sold by Glaxo at the request of
the UK government a very similar product had already been
in use in the USA where testing had been carried out. Glaxo
carried out chemical and animal testing which was extensive
by the standards of the time. Even using today's standards
it is not possible to devise testing in patients which would
have been scientifically or ethically appropriate. Initial
use in patients at least two major hospitals was carefully
monitored by Glaxo. (Note
5)
Q: What evidence did Glaxo
rely on for it's February 1971 data sheet information that
Myodil had "little or no irritant effect" and
would be gradually absorbed?
A: These statements were consistent with medical knowledge
of the product at the time. It was not until 1971 that Glaxo
received a report of chronic arachnoiditis associated with
the use of Myodil. (Note
6)
Q: Why did the data sheets
never insist on aspiration of Myodil following a myelogram.
A: Glaxo recommended aspiration but recognised that aspiration
was a difficult procedure which could cause considerable
discomfort and even nerve damage. Therefore a medical judgement
had to be made by the doctors involved on a case-by-case
basis. (Note 7)
Q: Why did you not respond
to earlier concerns in the medical literature about the
link between Myodil and arachnoiditis before August 1971?
A: We do not believe that the earlier literature showed
that there was such a connection. In April 1971 a case of
chronic arachnoiditis associated with the use of Myodil
was reported to Glaxo. Although it was uncertain whether
Myodil was the cause of the arachnoiditis, Glaxo at that
time inserted a warning in the package insert.
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Q: What research did you
ever fund or carry out to determine the incidence of Myodil
induced chronic arachnoiditis?
A: We do not believe that there was any acceptable research
which would have given us the information. Research before
the introduction of non-invasive techniques such as magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) would have required administering
myelograms which would have been the only way of diagnosing
arachnoiditis. This would not have been ethically acceptable.
(Note 8)
Q: What do you believe
the incidence to be, as a percentage, and what do you rely
on in support of that belief?
A: It isn't possible to arrive at such a figure for the
reasons given earlier, i.e. the symptoms and issues surrounding
arachnoiditis are extremely complex, with current medical
opinion indicating that people's suffering is due to factors
such as their original conditions, degenerative back disease
or surgery and other medical procedures.
(Note 9)
Q: Glaxo was told in 1971
that the toxicity of Myodil was "surrounded in mystery".
What was done to solve that mystery?
A: As indicated in the answer above chemical and animal
testing had been undertaken. To undertake further research
prior to the introduction of non-invasive techniques such
as MRI would have required undertaking a myelogram. It was
considered unethical to administer myelograms solely for
research purposes.(Note
10)
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Q: Glaxo conducted a reviews
of Myodil and concerns surrounding it in October 1971. What
action was taken following that review?
A: As stated earlier in 1971 a case of chronic arachnoiditis
associated with the use of Myodil was reported to Glaxo.
As a result and despite it being unclear whether or not
Myodil was the cause of the arachnoiditis, Glaxo inserted
a warning in the product's packaging.
(Note 11)
Q: Given the "mystery"
of toxicity, the spate of ADRs in 1970 and 1971 and the
growing evidence in medical literature of a link between
Myodil and chronic adhesive arachnoiditis, why was the product
not withdrawn until 1987?
A: The product was not withdrawn. Rather, it was discontinued
when other products and procedures were available and the
doctors had become skilled in using them.
(Note 12)
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***********
Note 1- Mislead Medical Profession(?)
As we will show you in the Medical Archive Section "this
knowledgeable and specialist medical profession" were
mislead into believing that the product was non-toxic by
the first paper on it in 1944. The US package inserts also
praised it as an absorbable substance, which it is not.
My own
dose of Myodil from 1974 lights up my 2001 MRI scans.
We now
have copies of the Glaxo package inserts for 1953 to 1971.
Extracts from the relevant ones are included here. We will
be publishing them in full in due course.
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Note 2 - "Muddying the waters" - Underlying Injuries
This is hogwash heard time after time, in courts in the
US and the UK, pharmaceuticals companies have employed their
own medical experts to "muddy the waters".
Derek Morrison's
case is another example of this "muddy the waters"
process. Towards the end of his compensation hearing the
defendant's medical expert, Dr Petty, produced a scenario
on the flight down to Sydney.
This proposed
that the disc which had originally caused his pain had been
traumatically thrust forward by something (he did not know
what), and had damaged the spinal cord in that area. This
was solidly repulsed by the Plaintiff's experts as a very
creative, but inaccurate piece of nonsense.
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Note 3
- Spreading the Word?
Like Mr. Garner, who interrogated Barry Newton of Lafayette
in 1994, I would like to know what methods, apart from the
small print on package inserts, either Lafayette or Glaxo
took to underline these dangers to the medical profession
and their patients?
Note 4
- Adverse Reactions and Time
Sometimes, as all Arachnoiditis sufferers know, the adverse
reaction may take as much as 20(plus) years to cause enough
damage leading to identyfiable symptoms. What about those
who are now disabled but were not in 1995 and furthermore
had no knowledge of this action.
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Note 5
- Reviews of the Literature
Did they carry out an extensive review of the literature
at the same time? This is the usual practice. If it was
extensive, why did they miss the comment on the 1944 paper
by Strain, et al, which stated that the sequelae (arachnoid
cysts) in patients who were injected with Iophendylate were
smaller than those with Lipiodol.
Can they
tell us why the initial paper in the UK described the product
as "non-toxic"? Did they take any notice of Tarlov's
1945 paper and Jaegar's paper in 1950, amongst others?
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Note 6
- Absorbability
Please refer to the Newton Transcript on the subject of
absorbability. There is also report from Dr Snell of Glaxo
to the Committee on the Safety of Medicines which is reproduced
below. Click here.
Note 7
Their 1973 package insert states: -
Dosage
and Administration
Myelography: In general sufficient Myodil is introduced
into the spinal subarachnoid space to allow all the structures
under suspicion to be outlined by simple posturing of the
patient. Usually 6 to 9mls are adequate. Occasionally up
to 18mls are necessary if the subarachnoid space is wide.
The material should be removed by aspiration after the examination
unless it is required for further study.
We know
from our research that the doctors in the UK usually left
the Myodil
inside the patient in, this was a general practice. In the
USA they normally aspirated (or removed) Pantopaque - the
US version.
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Note 8
- And the Scandinavians
Was it also acceptable to ignore the research being done
in the Scandinavian countries on a water based contrast
agent? Why did they feel that was neccessary?
Note 9
So they could compare the number of cases of arachnoiditis
reported to them with the amount of product sold, averaging
out the dose at 5mls to take account of variances in dosage
between 3 and 9mls.
Note 10
- The Scandinavian rejection of Myodil and Pantopaque.
Did this not concern a company who were trying to win world
market share? Did they not question why their product was
rejected?
If there were doubts regarding Myodil, which there obviously
were, did Glaxo not think it unethical to keep injecting
it into peoples' spines, thereby ignoring those doubts,
which existed among physicians and patients?
Thirdly, the continuing sale and use of Myodil despite the
doubts, was this not just a larger experiment on the part
of Glaxo to see how long they could keep the product going?
Like Lafayette in the US, Glaxo ended the war without any
major products for the market except this one.
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Note 11
- Doubts?
Surely any doubts surrounding a product are unacceptable.
The product should be withdrawn and only released again
once those doubts have been fully investigated. Any continuance
of sale and use following such doubts being raised is unethical.
Note 12
Though now thought to be almost as dangerous as Myodil,
water based contrast media were available from the invention
of Isovue in 1959 and Amipaque in 1969. Did Glaxo not consider
replacing the old oil based products in favour of these
less dangerous water based substances, or, were they locked
into some agreement with the producers of Iophendylate -
Kodak?
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